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Abstract
We characterize the macroeconomic performance of a set of industrialized
economies in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s and of
the last decade, focusing on the differences across episodes. We examine
four different hypotheses for the mild effects on inflation and economic
activity of the recent increase in the price of oil: (a) good luck (i.e. lack
of concurrent adverse shocks), (b) smaller share of oil in production, (c)
more flexible labor markets, and (d) improvements in monetary policy. We
conclude that all four have played an important role.
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Introduction
Since the 1970s, and at least until recently, macroeconomists have viewed
changes in the price of oil as as an important source of economic fluc-
tuations, as well as a paradigm of a global shock, likely to affect many
economies simultaneously. Such a perception is largely due to the two
episodes of low growth, high unemployment, and high inflation that char-
acterized most industriahzed economies in the mid and late 1970s. Con-
ventional accounts of those episodes of stagflation blame them on the large
increases in the price of oil triggered by the Yom Kippur war in 1973, and
the Iranian revolution of 1979, respectively.^
The events of the past decade, however, seem to call into question the rel-
evance of oil price changes as a signiflcant source of economic fluctuations.
The reason: Since the late 1990s, the global economy has experienced two
oil shocks of sign and magnitude comparable to those of the 1970s but,
in contrast with the latter episodes, both GDP growth and inflation have
remained relatively stable in much of the industrialized world.
Our goal in this paper is to shed light on the nature of the apparent changes
in the macroeconomic effects of oil shocks, as well as on some of its possible
causes. Disentangling the factors behind those changes is obviously key to
assessing the extent to which the episodes of stagflation of the 1970s can
reoccur in response to future oils shocks and, if so, to understanding the
role that monetary poHcy can play in order to mitigate their adverse effects.
One plausible hypothesis is that the eS'ects of the increase in the price of oil
proper have been similar across episodes, but have coincided in time with
large shocks of a very different nature (e.g. large rises in other commodity
prices in the 1970s, high productivity growth and world demand in the
2000s) . That coincidence could significantly distort any assessment of the
1. Most undergraduate textbooks make an unambiguous connection between the two
oil price hikes of 1973-1974 and 1979-1980 and the period of stagflation that ensued. See
e.g. Mankiw (2007, p. 274).
impact of oil shocks based on a simple observation of the movements in
aggregate variables around each episode.
In order to evaluate' this hypothesis one must isolate the component of
macroeconomic fluctuations associated with exogenous changes in the price
of oil. To do so, we identify and estimate the effects of an oil price shock
using structural VAR techniques. We report and compare estimates for
different sample periods and discuss how they have changed over time. We
follow two alternative approaches. The first one is based on a large VAR,
and allows for a break in the sample in the mid 1980s. The second approach
is based on rolling bivariate VARs, including the price of oil and one other
variable at a time. The latter approach allows for a gradual change in the
estimated effects of oil price shocks, without imposing a discrete break in
a single period.
Two conclusions clearlj' emerge from this analysis: First, there were indeed
other adverse shocks at work in the 1970s; the price of oil explains only part
of the stagflation episodes of the 1970s. Second, and importantly, the effects
of a given change in the price of oil have changed substantially over time.
Our estimates point to much larger effects of oil price shocks on inflation
and activity in the early part of the sample, i.e. the one that includes the
two oil shock episodes of the 1970s.
Our basic empirical findings are summarized graphically in Figure 1 (we
postpone a description of the underlying assumptions to Section 3). The
left-hand graph shows the responses of U.S. (log) GDP and the (log) CPI to
a 10 percent increase in the price of oil, estimated using pre-1984 data. The
right-hand graph displays the corresponding responses, based on post-1984
data. As the Figure makes clear, the response of both variables has become
more muted in the more recent period. As we show below, that pattern
can also be observed for other variables (prices and quantities) and many
(though not all) other countries considered. In sum, the evidence suggests
that economies face an improved trade-off in the more recent period, in the
face of oil price shocks of a similar magnitude.
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We then focus on the potential explanations for these changes over time.
We consider three hypotheses, not mutually exclusive:
First, real wage rigidities may have decreased over time. The presence of
real wage rigidities generates a tradeoff between stabilization of inflation
and stabilization of the output gap. As a result, and in response to an
adverse supply shock and for a given money rule, inflation will generally
rise more and output will decline more, the slower real wages adjust. A
trend towards more flexible labor markets, including more flexible wages,
could thus explain the smaller impact of the more recent oil shocks.
Second, changes in the way monetary policy is conducted may be responsi-
ble for the differential response of the economy to the oil shocks. In partic-
ular, the stronger commitment by central banks to maintaining a low and
stable rate of inflation, reflected in the widespread adoption of more or less
explicit inflation targeting strategies, may have led to an improvement in
the policy tradeoff that make it possible to have a smaller impact of a given
oil price increase on both inflation and output simultaneously.
Third, the share of oil in the economy may have declined sufficiently since
the 1970s to account for the decrease in the effects of its price changes.
Under that hypothesis, changes in the price of oil have increasingly turned
into a sideshow, with no significant macroeconomic effects (not unlike fluc-
tuations in the price of caviar).
To assess the merits of tlie different hypotheses we proceed in two steps.
First, we develop a simple version of the new-Keynesian model where (im-
ported) oil is both consumed by households and used as a production input
by firms. The model aUows us to examine how the economy's response to
an exogenous change in the price of oil is affected by the degree of real wage
rigidities, the nature and credibility of monetary policy, and the share of
oil in production and consumption. We then look for more direct evidence
pointing to the relevance and quantitative importance of each of those
hypotheses. We conclude that all three are hkely to have played an impor-
tant role in explaining the different effects of oil prices during the 1970s
and, during the last decade.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives a short summary of how
our paper fits in the hterature. Section 2 presents basic facts. Section 3
presents results from multivariate VARs. Section 4 presents results from
rolling bivariate VARs. Section 5 presents the model. Section 6 uses the
model to analyze the role of real rigidities, credibility in monetary policy,
and the oil share. Section 7 concludes.
1 Relation to the Literature
Our paper is related to many strands of research.
The first strand is concerned with the effects of oil price shocks on the
economy. The seminal work in that literature is Bruno and Sachs (1985),
who were the first to analyze in depth the effects of oil prices of the 1970s on
output -and inflation in the major industrialized countries. They explored
many of the themes of our paper, the role of other shocks, the role of
monetary policy, and the role of wage setting.
On the empirical side, Hamilton showed in a series of contributions (see,
in particular, Hamilton (1983, 1996)) that most of U.S. recessions were
preceded by increases in the price of oil, suggesting an essential role for oil
price increases as one of the main cause of recessions. The stability of this
relation has been challenged by a number of authors, in particular Hooker
(1996). Our findings that the effects of the price of oil have changed over
time is consistent with the mixed findings of this line of research.
On the theoretical side, a number of papers have assessed the abihty of
standard models to account for the size and nature of the observed effects of
oil price shocks. Thus, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) argued that it was
difficult to explain the sheer size of these effects in the 1970s. They argued
that something else was going on, namely an endogenous increase in the
markup of firms, leading to a larger decrease in output. Finn (2000) showed
that effects of the relevant size could be generated in a perfectly competitive
RBC model, by allowing for variable capital utilization. Neither mechanism
would seem to account for the depth of the effects of the 1970s and not in
the 2000s. The latter observation motivates our focus on the role of real
wage rigidities, and the decline in these rigidities over time, an explanation
we find more convincing than changes in either the behavior of markups or
capacity utilization over time. In following this line, we build on our earlier
work on the implications of real wage rigidities and their interaction with
nominal price stickiness (Blanchard and Gali 2007).
A second strand of research related to the present paper deals with the
possible changes over time in the effects of oil shocks. Of course, that strand
is in turn related to the literature on the "Great Moderation," a term
used to refer to the decrease in output fluctuations over the last 30 years
(e.g., Blanchard and Simon (2001), Stock and Watson (2003)). The latter
literature has tried to assess to what extent the dechnes in volatihty have
been due to "good luck" (i.e. smaller shocks) or changes in the economy's
structure (including policy changes). In that context, some authors have
argued that the stagflations of the 1970s were largely due to factors other
than oil. Most prominently, Barsky and Kilian (2002) argue that they may
have been partly caused by exogenous changes in monetary policy, which
coincided in time with the rise in oil prices. Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson
(1997) argue that much of the decline in output and employment was due
to the rise in interest rates, resulting from the Fed's endogenous response
to the higher inflation induced by the oil shocks.
While our evidence suggests that oil price shocks can only account for a
fraction of the fluctuations of the 1970s, our findings that the dynamic
effects of oil shocks have decreased considerably over time, combined with
the 'observation that the oil shocks themselves have been no smaller, is
consistent with the hypothesis of structural change.
We know of four papers which specifically focus, as we do, on the chang-
ing impact of oil shocks. Hooker (2002) analyzes empirically the changing
weight of oil prices as an explanatory variable in a traditional Phillips
curve specification for the U.S. economj'. He finds that pass-through from
oil to prices has become negligible since the early eighties, but cannot find
evidence for a significant role of the decline in energy intensity, the dereg-
ulation of energy industries, or changes in monetary policy as a factor
behind that lower pass-through. De Gregorio, Landerretche, and Neilson
(2007) provide a variety of estimates of the degree of pass-through from oil
prices to inflation, and its changes over time, for a large set of countries. In
addition to estimates of PhiUips curves along the fines of Hooker (2002),
they also provide evidence based on rolling VARs, as we do in the present
paper, though they use a different speciflcation, and focus exclusively on
the effects on inflation. Their paper also examines a number of potential
explanations, including a change in the response of the exchange rate (in
the case of non-U. S. countries), and the virtuous effects of being in a low
inflation environment. In two recent papers, developed independently, Her-
rera and Pesavento (2007), and Edelstein and Kilian (2007), also document
the decrease in the effects of oil shocks on a number of aggregate variables
using a VAR approach. Herrera and Pesavento, following the approach of
Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997), explore the role of changes in re-
sponse of monetary policy to oil shocks in accounting for the more muted
efi'ects of those shocks in the recent period. Their answer is largely neg-
ative: Their findings point to a more stabilizing role of monetary pohcy
in the 1970s relative to the recent period. Edelstein and Kilian focus on
changes in the composition of U.S. automobile production, and the decUn-
ing importance of the U.S. automobile sector. Given that the decline in the
effects of the price of oil appears to be present in a large number of OECD
countries, this explanation appears perhaps too U.S. specific.
2 Basic Facts
Figure 2 displays the evolution of the price of oil since 1970. More specif-
ically, it shows the quarterly average price of a barrel of West Texas In-
termediate, measured in U.S. dollars.'^ The figure shows how a long spell
of stability came to an end in 1973, triggering a new era characterized by
large and persistent fluctuations in the price of oil, punctuated with occa-
sional sharp run-ups and spikes, and ending with the prolonged rise of the
past few years. The shaded areas in the figure correspond to tlie four large
oil shock episodes discussed below.
2. The description of the styhzed facts discussed below is not altered significantly if
one uses alternative oil price measures, such as the PPI index for crude oil (used e.g. by
Hamilton (1983) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996)) or the price of imported crude
oil (e.g. Kilian (2006)).
Figure 2. Oil Price ($ per barrel)
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
Figure 3 displays the same variable, now normalized by the U.S. GDP
deflator, and measured in natural logarithms (multiplied by 100, so that
its variations can be interpreted as percent changes). This transformation
gives us a better sense of the magnitude of the changes in the real price
of oil. As the figure makes clear, such changes have often been very large,
and concentrated over relatively short periods of time.
Figure 3. Log Real Oil Price (1970:1=100)
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
It is useful to start with descriptive statistics associated with the large oil
shocks visible in the previous figures. We define a large oil shock as an
episode involving a cumulative change in the (log) price of oil above 50
percent, sustained for more than four quarters. This gives us four episodes,
starting in 1973, 1979, 1999, and 2002 respectively. Exact dates for each
run-up are given in Table 1 (given our definition, the largest price changes
need not coincide with the starting date, and, indeed, they don't). For
convenience we refer to those episodes as 01, 02, 03 and 04, respectively.
Note that this criterion leaves out the price rise of 1990 (triggered by the
Gulf War), due to its quick reversal. We also note that 03 is somewhat
different, since it is preceded by a significant price decline.
Table 1 lists, for each episode, (i) the run-up period, (ii) the date at which
the cumulative log change attained the 50 percent threshold (which we use
as a benchmark date below), and (iii) the percent change from trough to
peak (measured by the cumulative log change), both in nominal and real
terms. The duration of the episodes ranges from 3 quarters (01) to 20
quarters (04).'^
Interestingly, the size of the associated nominal price rise is roughly similar
across episodes, around 100 percent. A similar characterization emerges
when we use the cumulative change in the real price of oil (with the price
normalized by the GDP defiator) , except for 02 where the rise is somewhat
smaller because of the high rate of inflation during that episode. In short,
the four episodes involve oil shocks of a similar magnitude. In particular,
the numbers do not seem to justify a characterization of the two recent
shocks as being milder in size than the shocks of the 1970s.
3. While our sample ends in 2007:3, it is clear that episode (04) has not ended yet. The
price of oil has continued to increase, in both 2007:4 and 2008:1.
10
Table 1. Postwar Oil Shock Episodes
run-up period 50% rise date max log change max log change
(real)
01 1973:3-1974:1 1974:1 104% 96 %
02 1979:1-1980:2 1979:3 98% 85 %
03 1999:1-2000:4 1999:3 91 % 87%
04 2002:1-2007:3 2003:1 125% 110%
In spite of their relatively similar magnitude, these four oil shock episodes
have been associated with very different macroeconomic performances. Fig-
ures 4 and 5, which show respectively the evolution of (annual) CPI infla-
tion and the unemployment rate in the U.S. over the period 1970:1-2007:3,
provide a visual illustration.
Figure 4. Oil Shocks and CPI Inflation
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
CPI Inllailon Real Oil Price
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Figure 5. Oil Shocks and Unemployment
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 196B 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
Unemployment Real Oil Pfice
Each figure shows, in addition to the variable displayed, the (log) real price
of oil and the four shaded areas representing our four oil shock episodes.
Note that the timing of 01 and 02 coincide with a sharp increase in infla-
tion, and mark the beginning of a large rise in the unemployment rate. In
each case, both inflation and unemployment reached a peak a few quarters
after the peak in oil prices (up to a level of 11.3% and 13.4%, respectively,
in the case of inflation, 8.8% and 10.6% for the unemployment rate). The
pattern of both variables during the more recent oil shock episodes is very
different. First, while CPI inflation shows a slight upward trend during both
'03 and 04, the magnitude of the changes involved is much smaller than
that observed for 01 and 02, with the associated rises in inflation hardly
standing out relative to the moderate size of fluctuations shown by that
variable since the mid-1980s. Second, the variation in the unemployment
rate during and after 03 and 04 is much smaller in size than that observed
in 01 and 02. The timing is also very different: While 01 and 02 lead to
a sharp rise in unemployment, the latter variable keeps dechning during
the length of the 03 episode, with its rebound preceding 04. Furthermore,
after a persistent (though relatively small) increase, unemployment starts
declining in the midst of 04, i.e. while the price of oil is still on the rise.
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Tables 2 and 3 provide related evidence for each of the G7 countries as well
as for three aggregates (the G7, the euro-12, and the OECD countries).^
More specifically, Table 2 displays, for each country and episode, the aver-
age rate of inflation over the 8 quarters following each episode's benchmark
date (at which the 50% threshold oil price rise is reached) minus the aver-
age rate of inflation over the 8 quarters immediately preceding each run-up.
Note that the increase in inflation associated with 01 is typically larger
than the one for 02. The most striking evidence, however, relates to 03
and 04, which are typicaUy associated with a change in inflation in their
aftermath of a much smaller size than that following 01 and 02.^ The last
two columns, which average the inflation change for 01-02 and 03-04,
makes the same point in a more dramatic way.
Table 2. Oil Shock Episodes: Change in Inflation
01 02 03 04 AVG (1,2) AVG (3,4)
Canada 4.7 1.8 2.2 0.5 3.3 1.4
Germ-any 0.1 2.6 1.1 -0.2 1.4 0.4
France 5.4 3.1 1.3 0.5 4.2 0.9
U.K. 10.2 4.3 0.0 0.5 7.3 0.3
Italy 7.7 5.6 1.0 -0.1 6.6 0.4
Japan 7.9 1.0 -1.7 0.9 4.4 -0.4
U.S. 4.9 4.0 1.7 -0.2 4.5 0.7
G7 4.8 1.9 0.3 0.0 3.3 0.2
Euro 12 4.3 2.7 1.3 -0.5 3.5 0.4
OECD 4.9 1.8 0.1 -0.5 3.4 -0.2
4. We use quarterly data from OECD's Economic Outlook Databcise. For the purpose
of this exercise, inflation is the annualized quarter-to-quarter rate of change in the CPI.
These two tables have not been updated, and use data up to the end of 2005 only.
5. Even for Canada and Germanj', the largest change in inflation occurs in either Ol
or 02.
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The evidence on output across episodes is shown in Table 3, which reports
for each country and episode (or averages of two episodes in the case of
the last two columns) the cumulative GDP gain or loss over the 8 quarters
following each episode's benchmark date, relative to a trend given by the
cumulative GDP growth rate over the 8 quarters preceding each episode.
The pattern closely resembles that shown for inflation: 01 and 02 are
generally associated with GDP losses that are much larger than those cor-
responding to 03 and 04 (with the latter involving some small GDP gains
in some cases). When averages are taken over pairs of episodes the pattern
becomes uniform, pointing once again to much larger output losses during
and after the oil shocks of the 1970s.
Table 3. Oil Shock Episodes: Cumulative GDP Change
01 02 03 04 AVG (1,2) AVG (3,4)
Canada -8.3 -1.0 -1.5 3.2 -4.6 0.8
Germany -9.6 -3.5 1.3 -2.5 -6.6 -0.6
France -7.6 -4.4 0.6 1.2 -6.0 0.9
U.K. -16.4 -9.2 0.4 2.5 -12.8 1.4
Italy -8.6 0.4 3.0 -2.0 -4.1 0.5
Japan -16.1 -4.4 7.6 3.3 -10.3 5.4
U.S. -13.3 -11.8 -3.7 7.1 -12.5 1.7
G7 -12.6 -7.7 -0.2 3.9 -10.2 1.8
Eurol2 -9.1 -2.9 1.0 -0.4 -6.0 0.3
OECD -11.2 -6.5 0.1 4.1 -8.9 2.1
The evidence presented above is consistent with the hypothesis that the
macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks have become smaller over time,
being currently almost negligible (at least in comparison with their ef-
fects in the 1970s). But it is also consistent with the hypothesis that other
(non-oil) shocks have coincided in time with the major oil shocks, either
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reinforcing the adverse effects of the latter in the 1970s, or dampening them
during the more recent| episodes. In order to sort out those possibilities we
turn next to a more structured analysis of the co-movements between oil
prices and other variables.
3 Estimating the Effects of Oil Price Shocks using
Structural VARs
In this section we provide more structural evidence on the macroeconomic
effects of oil price shocks, and changes over time in the nature and size of
those effects. We provide evidence for the United States, Prance, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan, using a 6-variable VAR. In the next
section we turn to a more detailed analysis of the U.S. evidence, using a
t
battery of rolling bivariate VARs.
Our baseline VAR makes use of data on the nominal price of oil (in dollars),
three inflation measures (CPI, GDP deflator, and wages) and two quantities
(GDP and employment). By using a multivariate specification, we allow
for a variety of shocks in addition to the oil shock that is our focus of
interest. We identify oil shocks by assuming that unexpected variations
in the nominal price of oil are exogenous relative to the contemporaneous
values of the remaining macroeconomic variables included in the VAR.
In other words, we take the oil shock to correspond to the reduced form
innovation to the (log) nominal oil price, measured in U.S. dollars.
This identification assumption will clearly be incorrect if economic devel-
opments in the country under consideration affect the world price of oil
coiitemporaneously. This may be either because the economy under con-
sideration is large, or because developments in the country are correlated
with world developments. For example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1996),
who rely on the same identification assumption as we do when studying
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the effects of oil shocks on the U.S. economy, restrict their sample period
to end in 1980 on the grounds that variations in the price of oil may have
a significant endogenous component after that date. We have therefore
explored an alternative cissumption, namely, letting the price of oil react
contemporaneously to current developments in the two quantity variables
(output, and employment), while assuming that quantity variables do not
react contemporaneously to the price of oil. Because the contemporaneous
correlations between quarterly quantity and oil price innovations are small,
the results are nearly identical, and we do not report them in the text.
Another approach would be to use, either in addition or in substitution to
the oil price, a more exogenous variable to proxy for oil shocks. This is the
approach followed by Kilian (2007), who constructs and uses a proxy for
unexpected movements in global oil production. What matters, however,
to any given country is not the level of global oil production, but the price
at which firms and households can purchase oil, which in turn depends also
on world demand for oil. Thus, if the price of oil rises as a result of, say,
higher Chinese demand, this is just like an exogenous oil supply shock for
the remaining countries. This is indeed why we are fairly confident in our
identification approach: The large residuals in our oil price series are clearly
associated either with identifiable episodes of large supply disruptions or,
in the more recent past, with increases in emerging countries' demand.
These observations largely drive our estimates and our impulse response
functions.
For each of the six countries, we estimate a VAR containing six variables:
the dollar price of oil (expressed in log differences), CPI inflation, GDP
deflator inflation, wage inflation, and the log changes in GDP and employ-
ment.'^ We use the dollar price of oil rather than the real price of oil, to
6. For the United States we use non-farm business hours instead of employment, and the
wage refers to non-farm business compensation per hour. For simplicity we use the term
employment to refer to both hours (in the case of the United States) and emploj'ment
proper (for the remaining countries).
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avoid dividing by an endogenous variable, the GDP deflator. For the same
reason we do not convert the price of oil into domestic currency for non-US
countries. For the United States, the data are taken from the USECON
database, and cover the sample period 1960:1-2007:3. For the remaining
countries, the data are drawn from OECD's Economic Outlook database,
with the sample period being 1970:1-2007:3. Our three inflation measures
are quarter-to-quarter, expressed in annualized terms. Each equation in
our VAR includes four lags of the six variables above, a constant term and
a quadratic trend fitted measure of productivity growth.
Some of the oil price changes, and by implication, some of the residuals in
the price of oil equation, are extremely large. The change in the price of
oil for 1974:1, for example, is equal to eight times its standard deviation
over the sample. Such large changes are likely to lead to small sample bias
wheiv estimating the oil price equation: The best OLS fit is achieved by
reducing the size of these particular residuals, thus by spuriously linking
these very large realizations to movements in current or past values of the
other variables in the regression. This in turn overstates the endogenous
component of the price of oil, and understates the size of the true residuals.
We deal with this issue by estimating the oil price equation using a sample
which excludes all oil price changes larger than three standard deviations.
(These large changes in oil prices are clearly essential in giving us precise
estimates of the effects of oil prices on other variables. Thus, we use the
complete sample when estimating the other equations.)
3.1 Impulse Responses
Figures 6a-6f display the estimated impulse response functions (IRFs) for
the different variables of interest to an oil price shock where, as discussed
above, the latter is identified as the innovation in the oil price equation.
Estimates are reported for two different sample periods: 1970:1-1983:4
(1960:1-1983:1 for the United States) and 1984:1-2007:3 (1984:1-2005:4 for
17
German}' and Italy). The break date chosen corresponds roughly to the
beginning of the Great Moderation in the United States, as identified by
several authors (e.g. McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000). Note that each
subperiod contains two of the four large oil shock episodes identified in the
previous section.
One-standard-deviation confidence intervals, obtained using a Monte Carlo
procedure, are shown on both sides of the point estimates. The estimated
responses of GDP and employment are accumulated and shown in levels.
The size of the shock is normalized so that it raises the price of oil by 10
percent on impact. This roughly corresponds to the estimated standard
deviations of oil price innovations for the two subsamples, which are very
similar,^ In all cases, the real price of oil shows a near-random walk response
(not shown here), i.e. it jumps on impact, and then stays around a new
plateau.
The estimates for the United States, shown in Figure 6a, fit pretty well
the conventional wisdom about the effects of a rise in oil prices. (Figure 1,
presented in the introduction, corresponds to Figure 6a, with the results
for the CPI shown in levels rather than rates of change.) For the pre-
1984 period, CPI inflation shifts up immediately, and remains positive for
a protracted period. The response of GDP inflation and wage inflation is
similar, though more gradual. Output and emplojmient decline persistently,
albeit with a lag. Most relevant for our purposes, the responses of the
same variables in the post-19S4 period are considerably more muted, thus
suggesting a weaker impact of oil price shocks on the economy. The only
exception to this pattern is given by CPI inflation, whose response on
impact is very similar across periods (though its persistence is smaller in
the second period)
.
This may not be surprising since part of the increase
in oil prices is reflected mechanically in the oil component of the CPI.
7. The estimated standard deviation of oil price innovations is 9.4 percent in the pre-
1984 period, 12.4 percent in the post-84 period.
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The estimates for R'ance and the United Kingdom show a pattern very sim-
ilar to that of the United States. In the case of France, the contrast between
the early and the late periods is particularly strong, both in terms of the
size and the persistence of the effects, and for both prices and quantities. In
the case of the United Kingdom, the response of inflation variables is almost
non-existent in the latter period though, in contrast with Fi'ance, there is
some evidence of a dechne in output and emplojanent (albeit smaller than
in the first sample period).
Some of the estimated responses for Germany and Italy fit conventional
wisdom less well. The inflation measures in Germany hardly change in
response to the rise in oil prices in either period, though the impact on
output and employment is more adverse in the pre- 1984 period. This is
consistent with a stronger anti-inflationary stance of the Bundesbank, rel-
ative to other central banlis. The slight increase in employment and output
in the post-1984 period goes against conventional wisdom. In the case of
Italy, there is barely any employment response in the pre-1984 period. Still,
for both countries the sign of most of the responses accord with conven-
tional wisdom, and the responses are smaller in the post-1984 period.
The story is different for Japan. The sign of many of the responses to the
rise in oil prices is often at odds with standard priors. Also, the uncertainty
of the estimates is much larger, as reflected in the wider bands. The effect
on inflation is weak and does not have a clear sign in either period. There
is a (slight) rise in output in both periods, and of emplo)''ment in the post-
1984 period.
In short, except for Japan (and to some extent, for Germany), most of the
responses fit conventional wisdom rather well: An increase in the price of
oil leads to more wage and price inflation, and to a decrease in employment
and output for some time. In all cases, however, the effects on both inflation
and activity are considerably weaker in the second subsample than in the
first.
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3.2 Variance and Historical Decompositions
How important are oil shocks in accounting for-tlie observed fluctuations
in inflation, output and employment in the U.S. economy?
Table 4 and Figure 7 answer this question by using the decomposition as-
sociated with the estimated six-variable VAR, with data starting in 1960.
For each variable and sample period, they compare the actual time se-
ries with the component of the series that results from putting all shocks,
except the identified oil price shocks, equal to zero. Series for GDP and
employment are accumulated, so the resulting series are in log-levels. All
series are then HP-filtered so that the series can be interpreted as devia-
tions from a slowly moving trend. Table 4 provides statistics for the role
of oil shocks as a source of fluctuations, including its percent contribution
to the volatility of each variable (including the real price of oil, measured
relative to the GDP deflator), both in absolute and relative terms. Figure
7 plots the series over time.
The estimated standard deviations of the oil-driven component of the dif-
ferent variables ("conditional standard deviations"), given in the first three
columns of Table 4, show that the volatility of fluctuations caused by oil
shocks has diminished considerably for all variables, except for the real
price of oil itself. In fact, the standard deviation of the exogenous compo-
nent of the latter variable is about 20 percent larger in the second sample
period. This can be explained to a large extent by the hmited variation in
the reaLprice of oil before the 1973 crisis, and despite the two large spikes
in that year and during 1979-80.
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TABLE 4: The Contribution of Oil Shocks to U.S. Economic
Fluctuations, 1960:1-2007:3
Conditional Standard Deviation Conditional SD
Unconditional SD
60:1-83:4 84:1-07:3 Ratio 60:1-83:4 84:1-07:3
Oil Price (Real) 12.9 15.4 1.19 0.82 0.88
CPI Inflation 0.89 0.74 0.83 0.43 0.55
GDP Inflation 0.71 0.15 0.24 0.50 0.25
Wage Inflation 0.69 0.56 0.81 0.41 0.23
GI^P 0.59 0.28 0.48 0.34 0.31
Hours 0.76 0.43 0.57 0.42 0.30
This evidence reinforces our earlier IRFs-based findings of a more muted
response of all variables to an oil shock of a given size. Thus, the change
in the way the economy has responded to oil shocks has contributed to the
dampening of economic fluctuations since the mid-1980s, the phenomenon
known as the Great Moderation. Interestingly, our estimates suggest that
this has been possible in spite of the shghtly larger volatility of oil prices
themselves.
The next two columns of Table 4 give the relative contribution of oil shocks
to movements in the various variables, measured as the ratio of the condi-
tional to the unconditional standard deviation. The estimates suggest that
the relative contribution of oil shocks to fluctuations in quantity variables
(GDP and employment) has remained roughly unchanged over time, at
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around 1/3. In the case of wage inflation and GDP deflator inflation, the
contribution of oil shocks has declined to 1/4 in both cases, from a level
close to 1/2. In contrast, the contribution of oil shocks to CPI inflation has
increased in the recent period. Note that this is consistent with a relatively
stable core CPI, with oil price changes being passed through to the energy
component of the CPI, and accounting for, according to our estimates, as
much as sixty percent of the fluctuations in overall CPI inflation.
Figure 7. The Role of Oil Price Shocks
US - Historical decomposilion
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Figure 7 allows us to focus on the contribution of oil prices to the 1973-
1974 and 1979-1981 episodes. It shows the substantial but non-exclusive
role of exogenous oil shocks during each of the two episodes. In particular,
while for our three inflation variables the oil price shocks seem to have
accounted for the bulk of the increases in 1973-1975 and 1979-1981, no
more than a half of the observed decline in employment and output during
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those episodes can be attributed to the oil shocks themselves. Thus, our
findings suggest that other shocks played an important role in triggering
those episodes.
Figure 8. The Role of Shocks to Crude Materials
Prices
us - Historical decomposition
yv-^'V-^-'^Mn^^-VV^
Within our 6-variable VAR, our partial identification approach does not
allow us to determine what those additional underlying shocks may have
been. Yet, when we replace the price of oil by the broader PPI index for
crude materials in our six-variable VAR, the estimates of GDP and em-
ployment driven by exogenous shocks to that broader price index track
more closely the movements of the actual time series themselves in the
pre-1984 period, including the two large oil shock episodes contained in
that period, as shown in Figure 8. In particular those shocks account for
more than half the fluctuations in all variables over the pre-1984 period.
On the other hand, such broader supply shocks play a very limited role in
accounting for the fluctuations in output and emploj'ment in the post-1984
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period (though a more important one in accounting for variations in CPI
inflation, in a way consistent with earlier evidence).
4 U.S. Evidence Based on Rolling Bivariate Regressions
So far, we have analyzed the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks
and their change over time under the maintained assumption of a discrete
break sometime around the mid-1980s. While the findings reported above
are largely robust to changes in the specific date of the break, some of
the potential explanations (discussed below) for the change in the effects
of oil price shocks are more likel}' to have been associated with a more
gradual variation over time. This leads us to adopt a more flexible approach,
and estimate rolling IRFs to oil price shocks, based on a simple dynamic
equation linking a variable of interest to its own lags and the current and
lagged values of the change in the (log) oil price. We do this using a moving
window of 40 quarters, with the first moving window centered in 1970.
More specificallj', letting yt and p° denote the variable of interest and the
price of oil, respectively, we use OLS to estimate the regression:
4 4
yt = a + Y2(^3 yt-j + Yl 'yj ^Pt-j + "t
j=l j=0
and use the resulting estimates to obtain the implied dynamic response of
yt (or a transformation thereof) to a permanent 10 percent (log) change
in the price of oil, thus implicitly assuming in the simulation that Ap° is
an i.i.d. process (which is roughly consistent with the random walk-like
response of the price of oil obtained using our multivariate model).
Relative to the multivariate model analyzed in the previous section, correct
identification of oil price shocks is obviously more doubtful in the present
bivariate model, given the lower dimension specification of the economj^'s
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dynamics. This shortcoming must be traded-off with the possibihty of es-
timating the VAR with much shorter samples and, hence, being able to
obtain our roUing IRFs. In order to check the consistency with our earlier
results, we first computed the average IRFs across moving windows within
each of the subperiods considered earlier (pre- 1984 and post-1984), and
found the estimated IRFs (not shown) to be very similar to the ones ob-
tained earlier. In particular, both the inflation variables, as well as output
and employment, show a more muted response in the more recent period.
Figures 9a-9e display the rolling IRFs for our three inflation measures,
output, and employment. Several features stand out:
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Response of CPI Inflation
Quarters after shock
Figure 9a.
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Response of GDP Deflator Inflation
Quarters after shock
Figure 9b.
33
Response ol Wage Inflation
Quarters after shock
Figure 9c.
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Response of GDP
Quarters aftershock
Figure 9d.
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Response of Employment
Quarters after shock
Figure 9e.
CPI inflation appears quite sensitive to tlie oil shock over the entire sample
period, but particularly so in the late 1970s, when inflation is estimated
to rise more than 1 percentage point two/three quarters after a 10 percent
rise in the oil price. The response becomes steadily more muted over time
and, perhaps as important, less persistent, especially in the more recent
period (in a way consistent with our earlier evidence based on the 6-variable
VAR). The evolution over time in the response of GDP deflator inflation
to an oil price shock is similar to that that of CPI inflation, but shows a
more dramatic contrast, with the response at the end of our sample being
almost negligible. The response of wage inflation is rather muted all along,
except for its large persistent increases in the late 1970s and early 80s, and
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a similar spike in tlie 1990s.
The most dramatic changes are in the responses of output and employment
(Figures 9d-e)
.
In the early part of the sample output is estimated to decline
as much as 1 percent two years after the 10 percent change in the price of
oil. The estimated response, however, becomes weaker over time, with the
point estimates of that response becoming slightly positive for the most
recent period. A similar pattern can be observed for employment.
The previous evidence thus reinforces the picture that emerged from the
earlier evidence, one which strongly suggests a vanishing effect of oil shocks
on macroeconomic variables, both real and nominal. In the next section we
try to uncover some of the reasons why.
5 Modeling the Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Price
Shocks: A Simple Framework
We now develop a simple model of the macroeconomic effects of oil price
shocks. Our focus is on explaining the different response of the economy
to oil price shocks in the 1970s and the 2000s. With this in mind, we focus
on three potential changes in the economy:
First, the behavior of wages. To us, this looks a priori like the most plau-
sible candidate. The 1970s were times of strong unions, and high wage
indexation. In the 2000s, unions are much wea,ker, and wage indexation
has practically disappeared.
Second, the role of monetary policy. Faced with a new type of shock, the
central banks of the 1970s did not know at first how to react, policy mis-
takes were made, and central bank credibility was low. In the 2000s, supply
shocks are no longer new, monetary pohcy is cleai'ly set, and credibihty is
much higher.
37
Third, and trivially, the quantitative importance of oil in the economy.
Increases in the price of oil have led to substitution away from oil, and a
decrease in the relevant shares of oil in consumption and in production. The
question is whether this decrease can account for much of the difference in
the effects of oil prices in the 1970s and the 2000s.®
We start from the standard new-Keynesian model and introduce two modi-
fications. First, we introduce oil both eis an input in consumption and as an
input in production. We assume the country is an oil importer, and that the
real price of oil (in terms of domestic goods) follows an exogenous process.
Second, we allow for real wage rigidities, along the lines of our earlier work
(Blanchard and Gali 2007). We present only log-linearized relations in the
text, leaving the full derivation to Appendix 1. Lower case letters denote
logarithms of the original variables, and for notational simplicity, we ignore
all constants.
5.1 The Role of Oil
Oil is used both by firms in production and by consumers in consumption:
Production is given by
qt = at + an nt + am rnt
where % is (gross) domestic output; at is an exogenous technology para-
meter; nt is labor; m.t is the quantity of imported oil used in production;
8. Some observers have suggested another factor, an increase in hedging against oil
price shocks by oil users. What is known about hedging by airlines suggests, however
that, while hedging is more prevalent than in the 1970s, its extent remains limited, with
few hedges going beyond a year. See for example Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006a,
2006b).
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and Q'n + Q'm < 1-^
Consumption is given by
Ct = (1 - X) Cq,t + X Cm,t
where q is consumption; Cq^t is the consumption of domestically produced
goods (gross output); and Cm,t is the consumption of imported oil.
In this environment, it is important to distinguish between two prices, the
price of domestic output Pq^t, and the price of consumption pc,i- Let Pm.t
be the price of oil, and st = Pm,t — Pq,t be the real price of oil. Prom the
definition of consumption, the relation between the consumption price and
the domestic output price is given by
Pc,t = Pq,t + X St (1)
Increases in the real price of oil lead to an increase in the consumption
price relative to the domestic output price.
5.2 Households
The behavior of households is characterized by two equations. The first is
an intertemporal condition for consumption:
Ct = Et{ct+i} - {it - Et{TTc,t+i}) (2)
where it is the nominal interest rate, and Tr^t = Pc,t—Pc.t-\ is CPI inflation.
9. We use a Cobb-Douglas specification for convenience. It has the countertactual im-
plication that the share of oil in output remains constant. So, in our framework, when
looking at changes in the share over time, we must attribute it to a change in the para-
meter OLm- For our purposes, this appears innocuous.
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The second condition characterizes labor supply. If the labor market was
perfectly competitive, labor supply would be implicitly given by
m - Pc,t = Ct + (p nt
where Wt is the nominal wage, and nt is employment. This is the condition
that the consumption wage must equal the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure; cf> is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply.
We formahze real wage rigidities by modifying the previous equation to
read
Wt - Pc,t = {I - l) {ct + (l> nt) (3)
where we interpret the parameter 7 e [0,1] as an index of the degree of
real wage rigidities. While clearly ad-hoc, equation (3) is meant to cap-
ture in a parsimonious way the notion that real wages may not respond to
labor market conditions as much as implied by the model with perfectly
competitive markets. We have explored the implications of a dynamic ver-
sion of equation (3), in which the wage adjusts over time to the marginal
rate of substitution. This alternative is more attractive conceptually, and
gives richer dynamics. However, it is also analytically more complex, and
we have decided to present results using the simpler version above.
5.3 Firms
Given the production function, cost minimization implies that the firms'
demand for oil is given by rrit =
—ii^ — St + qt, where ji^ is the price markup.
Using this expression to eliminate irit in the production function gives a
reduced-form production function
<?t = :; {at + CCnUt - OLmSt - CtmlJ-l) (4)
1 - Ctm.
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Output is a decreasing function of the real price of oil, given employment
and technology.
Combining the cost minimization conditions for oil and for labor with the
aggregate production function yields the following factor price fi-ontier:
(I-QW) {wt-Pc,t) + {cem+ {'i--Qm)x) St+ (1 -»„ -Q^) Ut-at+ fJ.^ = (5)
Given productivity, an increase in the real price of oil must lead to one or
more of the following adjustments: (i) a lower consumption wage, (ii) lower
employment, (iii) a lower markup. Under our assumed functional forms,
it can be shown that with flexible prices and wages, the entire burden of
the adjustment in response to an increase in St falls on the consumption
wage, with employment and the markup remaining unchanged. But, as we
dis9uss next, things are different when we allow the markup to vary (as a
result of sticky prices), and wages to respond less than their competitive
labor markets counterpart.
Firms are assumed to set prices a la Calvo (1983), an assumption which
yields the following log-linearized equation for domestic output price infla-
tion (domestic inflation for short)
TTq,t = P Et{-Kq,t+\] " Ap /if (6)
where Ap = [(1 - 6){\ - /?^)/0][(a„ + a„)/(l + (1 - a„ + Q„)(e - 1))],
where 6 denotes the fraction of firms that leave prices unchanged, /3 is the
discount factor of households, and e is the elasticity of substitution between
domestic goods in consumption.
Note that this specification assumes a constant desired markup of firms. By
doing so, we rule out a mechanism examined by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1996) who argue that, to explain the size of the decline in output observed
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in response to oil shocks, one must assume countercyclical markups. We
do so not because we believe the mechanism is irrelevant, but because we
do not think that variations in the degree of countercyclicality of markups
are likely to be one of the main factors behind the differences between the
1970s and the 2000s.
5.4 Equilibrium
The real wage consistent with household choices (cum real wage rigidities)
is given by equation (3), and depends on consumption and employment.
The real wage consistent with the firms' factor price frontier is given by
equation (5) and depends on the real price of oil, the markup, and employ-
ment.
Together, these two relations imply that the markup is a function of con-
sumption, employment, and the real price of oil. Solving for consumption
by using the condition that trade be balanced gives:
ct = qt-X St + V l4 (")
where rj = am/i-M.^ — Q,n), with A4^ denoting the steady state gross
markup (now in levels). Combining this equation with the reduced form
production function gives consumption as a function of employment, pro-
ductivity, the real price of oil, and the markup
1
,
an f . ^rn \ , f a-m \ p
ct = :; at + rit - \ + ' S( + 77 - ^t
1 - am l-Ctm \ I -am J \ 1 - Qm /
If the steady state markup is not too large, the last term is small and can
safely be ignored. Replacing the expression for consumption in equation
(3) for the consumption wage, and then replacing the consumption wage
in the factor price frontier gives an expression for the markup
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/jf = -r„ nt - Ts st+ Ta at (8)
where
P _
(1 - an - am)l + (1 - Q-„)(l - 7)(1 + ^) ^Q
1 -
r —
-(l-7)(a.„-
7
- (1 - am)ri)
^
^"-1-
r. = —
-(l-7)(Qm-
7 {am + (1 -
- (1 - am)v)
1 - (1 -l'){am - (1 -am)v)
Using this expression for the markup in equation (6) gives the following
characterization of domestic inflation
TTq^t = Et{nq^t+i} + ApF^ nt + XpT^ St - XpFa at (9)
Under our assumptions, the first best level of employment can be shown
to be invariant to the real price of oil: Substitution and income effects
cancel.^'' If 7 = 0, i.e. if there are no real wage rigidities, then Fa and Tg
are both equal to zero, and domestic inflation only depends on employment.
Together, these two propositions imply that stabilizing domestic inflation
is equivalent to stabilizing the distance of employment fi-om first best—
a
result we have called elsewhere the "divine coincidence."
Positive values of 7 lead instead to positive values of Pq and P^. The higher
7, or the higher (a^ + (1 ~ ci>n)X')—an expression which depends on the
shares of oil in production and in consumption—the worse the trade-off
between stabilization of employment and stabilization of domestic inflation
in response to oil price shocks.
10. To see this, we can just determine equilibrium emploj'ment under perfect competition
in both goods and labor markets, corresponding to the assumptions /it = for all t and
7 = 0, respectively.
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5.5 Implications for GDP and the GDP Deflator
Note that the characterization of the equilibrium did not require introduc-
ing either value added or the value added deflator. But these are needed
to compare the implications of the model to the data..
The value added deflator Pyt is implicitly defined by pq^t = (1 ~ ci'm) Py,t +
Q'm J'm.f- Rearranging terms gives
Py,t = Pg,t - Z St (10)
-1- 0!m
thus implying a negative effect of the real price of oil on the value added
deflator, given domestic output prices.
The definition of value added, combined with the demand for oil, yields
the following relation between value added and output:
yt = qt + -, st + rjii'^ (11)
1
-Q;m
This in turn implies the following relation between value added and con-
sumption;
yt = ct+(-^^ + x) St (12)
V 1 - Clm /
An increase in the price of oil decreases consumption given value added
both because (imported) oil is used as an input in production, and used as
an input in consumption.
Under the same approximation as above, i.e. [ti ~ i"" ) Mf — 0, equa-
tions (4) and (11) imply the following relation between value added and
employment:
yt = -, (at + Oi-a nt) (13)
1 - Qm
Note that, under this approximation, the relation between value added and
employment does not depend on the real price of oil.
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5.6 Quantifying the Effects of Oil Price Shocks
Equations (1), (2), (9), (12), and (13), describe the equilibrium dynamics
of prices and quantities, given exogenous processes for technology and the
real price of oil, and a description of how the interest rate is determined
(i.e. an interest rate rule). We now use these conditions to characterize the
economy's response to an oil price shock.
Assume that at = for all t (i.e abstract from technology shocks). It follows
from (13) and the discussion above that the efhcient level of value added
is constant (and normalized to zero) in this case. Assume further that the
real price of oil follows an AR(1) process
St = Ps st-i + £t (14)
We can then summarize the equilibrium dynamics of value added and do-
mestic inflation through the sj^stem:
7i"9,f = P Et{ng^t+i} +Kyt + XpTs St (15)
yt = Et{yt+,} - [it - Et{7Tg^t+i}) + ""^^ ^'^ '^ (^6)
where k = Apr„(l - am)/an.
These two equations must be complemented with a description of monetary
policy. Assume an interest rate rule of the form
it = 07r Trq,t (17)
where (pjr > I. Note that in our model tt^^j corresponds to core CPI inflation,
a variable that many central banks appear to focus on as the basis for their
interest rate decisions.
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We can then solve for the equUibrium analytically, using the method of un-
determined coefficients. This yields the following expressions for domestic
inflation and output:
7r,,t = *7r St
where
yt = *y St
and
Domestic inflation and GDP follow AR(1) processes with the same first or-
der ccefRcient as the real price of oil. Their innovations are proportional to
the innovation in the real price of oil, with the coefficient of proportionality
depending on the parameters of the model.
Expressions for CPI inflation and employment can be obtained using (1)
and (13), respectively:
T^Ct = *7r St + X ^St
1 - Q'm
nt = Wy St
an
With these equations, we can turn to the discussion of the potential role of
the three factors we identified earlier, real wage rigidities, monetary policy,
and the quantitative importance of oil in the economy, in explaining the
differences between the 1970s and the 2000s. In all cases we use the evidence
we presented earlier for the United States as a benchmark.
46
6 Three Hypotheses on the Changing Effects of Oil
Price Shocks
In order to assess quantitatively tlie potential for oil price shocks to gen-
erate significant macroeconomic fluctuations, we first need to calibrate our
model. We assume the following parameter values:
The time unit is a quarter. We set the discount factor /3 equal to 0.99.
We set the Calvo parameter, 9, to 0.75. We choose the elasticity of output
with respect to labor, q„ , equal to 0.7. We assume (j) = I, thus implying a
unitary R'iscli labor supply elasticity.
As discussed in previous sections, changes in the volatility of the real price
of oil are unlikely to lie behind the changes in the size of the effects of
oil shocks. Thus, for simplicity, we assume an unchanged process for the
real price of oil. Based on the conditional standard deviation of the price
of oil for the period 1984:1-2005:4, we assume var{st) = (0.16)^. We set
Ps = 0.97.^^ Also, and unless otherwise noted, we set the shares of oil
in production and consumption (a„i and x) to equal 0.012 and 0.017,
respectively, which correspond to their values in 1997.
Most of the parameters above are kept constant across all the simulations
presented below. The exceptions, as well as our treatment of the remaining
parameters, varies depending on the hypothesis being considered in each
case.
6.1 Changes in Real Wage Rigidities
In the framework above, the presence of some rigidity in the adjustment
of real wages to economic conditions is a necessary ingredient in order
11. The price of oil would be better characterized as non-stationary. But we would then
have to extend our formalization of real wage rigidities to allow the wage to eventually
converge to the marginal rate of substitution. Thus, we assume the value of p to be high,
but less than one.
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to generate significant fluctuations in measures of inflation and economic
activity. Figure 10 illustrates this point by showing the range of volatilities
of CPI inflation (annualized, and expressed in percent) and GDP implied
by our calibrated model under the assumption of perfectly competitive
labor markets (7 = 0), and under two alternative calibrations. The first
calibration Eissumes a relatively favorable environment, with the two shares
of oil at their "low" values prevailing in 1997, and no credibility gap in
monetary pohcy, {5 = 0; the discussion of credibihty and the definition
of 6 will be given below). The second calibration assumes a less favorable
environment, with the shares of oil at their "high" values prevailing in 1973,
and the presence of a credibility gap in monetary policy {S = 0.5). For
each calibration, the figure plots the standard deviations of CPI inflation
and value added, as the coefficient on inflation in the Taylor rule, tp^,
varies from 1 to 5, a range of values that covers the empirically plausible
set (conditional on having a unique equilibrium). The exercise yields two
conclusions.
Figure 10. Volatility Ranges under Flexible Wages
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First, the slope of the relation between the standard deviation of GDP
and the standard deviation of CPI inflation is positive. This should not
be surprising: In the absence of real wage rigidities, there is no tradeoff'
between inflation and value added stabihzation. Hence, a policy that seeks
to stabilize domestic inflation more aggressively, also stabilizes value added.
In fact, one can reduce the volatility of both variables by choosing ^^^ to be
arbitrarily large (this is what we called the "divine coincidence" in an earlier
paper). Under the assumed rule, on the other hand, CPI inflation faces a
lower bound to its volatility, since it is affected directly by any change in
the price of oil, in proportion to the share of oil in the consumption basket.
Second, the model has a clear counterfactual implication. While lower val-
ues of ^TT yield positive standard deviations for both GDP and CPI infla-
tion, they also imply a positive correlation between GDP and CPI inflation
in response to price of oil shocks. Low values of (p-^ imply a positive response
of both GDP and CPI inflation to an increase in the price of oil, an impli-
cation obviously at odds with the data.
Figure 11 shows that the introduction of real wage rigidities alters that
picture substantial^. It plots three loci, corresponding to three different
values of the real wage rigidity parameter: 7 = 0.0, 7 = 0.6, and 7 = 0.9.
In the three cases, we assume an otherwise favorable environment, with the
1997 oil shares, and full credibility of monetary policy. As before, each locus
is obtained by varying 07r from 1 to 5. Several results are worth pointing
out:
First, the tradeoff generated by the presence of real wage rigidities is ap-
parent in the negative relationship between inflation volatility on the one
hand and GDP volatility on the other.
Second, while the introduction of real wage rigidities raises the volatility
of all variables (for any given (?ijr), the model's predictions still fall short of
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Figure 1 1 . Real Wage Rigidities and Policy Tradeoffs
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matching the (conditional) standard deviations of CPI inflation and GDP
in our two samples, represented by the two crosses.
Finally, and that shortcoming notwithstanding, the figure also makes clear
that a moderate reduction in the degree of real wage rigidities (e.g. a shift
of 7 from 0.9 to 0.6) can account for a substantial improvement in the
.policy tradeoff and hence on a simultaneous reduction in the volatility of
inflation and GDP resulting from oil price shocks (or supply shock, more
generally)
.
To what extent a reduction in the degree of real wage rigidities may have
been a factor behind the more muted effects of oil shocks in recent years?
We rely again on the bivariate rolling VAR approach used earlier to try
to answer this question, by seeking evidence of faster wage adjustment in
recent j^ears. In particular, we use this approach to estimate the responses of
the real consumption wage, the unemployment rate, and the wage markup,
deflned as the gap between the (log) consumption wage, wt — Pc,t, and the
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(log) marginal rate of substitution, Cj + (f>nt, with = 1, as in our baseline
calibration. In response to a rise in the real price of oil, we would expect
this markup to increase in the presence of real wage rigidities, which in
turn should be associated with a rise in unemplojmient.
Figures 12a-c display the relevant IRFs representing, as before, the esti-
mated response of each variable to a permanent 10 percent increase in the
dollar price of oil. Figure 12a shows that the consumption wage tends to
decline in response to the oil shock. While the response shows some vari-
ability over time, it does not show a tendency towards a larger response
of the consumption wage over time. Figure 12b shows that unemployment
tends to increase in response to the oil shock. It also shows that this re-
sponse has declined dramatically over time. An interpretation of these two
evolutions is that the decrease in real wages, which required a large increase
in unemployment in the 1970s, is now achieved with barely any increase in
unemplo}'ment today. This suggests, in turn, a decrease in real wage rigidi-
ties. Another way of making the same point, within the logic of the model,
is to look at the evolution of the wage markup. This is done in Figure 12c..
An increase in the oil price leads to an increase in the wage markup: That
is, the decrease in the consumption wage is smaller than the decrease in
the marginal rate of substitution. The effect has become, however, steadily
smaller over time, very rapidly so in the more recent period. This suggests
that the real consumption wage moves today much more in line with the
marginal rate of substitution than it did in the 1970s. '^
12. At least from a qualitative point of view, the previous evidence is robust to variations
in the calibration of parameter <p within a plausible range (which we take to be given by
the interval [0.5,5]).
51
Response ot Real Wage
Quarters after shock
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6.2 Changes in Monetary Policy
A number of studies (e.g. Clarida, Gall, and Gertler (2000)) have provided
evidence of a stronger interest rate response to variations in inflation over
the past two decades, relative to the 1960s and 1970s. It should be clear,
however, from the simulations of our model presented above that, other
things equal, a stronger anti-inflationary stance should have reduced the
volatihty of inflation, but increased that of GDP. In other words, that
evidence cannot explain—at least by itself—the lower volatility of both
inflation and economic activity in response to oil price shocks.
In addition to this change in behavior, captured by tire literature on em-
pirical interest rate rules, there is also widespread agreement that central
banks' commitment to keeping inflation low and stable has also become
moje credible over the past two decades, thanks to improved communica-
tions, greater transparency, the adoption of more or less explicit quantita-
tive inflation targets and, ultimately, by the force of deeds. In this section
we use the framework developed above to study the role that such an im-
provement in credibility may have had in accounting for the reduced impact
of oil shocks.
We model credibility as follows: As in our baseline model we assume that
the central bank follows an interest rate ride
it = (pTTT^q,t
The public, however, is assumed to perceive that interest rate decisions are
made according to
it = 07r(l - S) TTq^t + Vt
where {vt} is taken by the public to be an exogenous i.i.d monetary policy
shock, and 6 e [0, 1] can be interpreted as a measure of the credibility
gap. Below we restrict ourselves to cahbrations that guarantee a unique
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equilibrium, which requires that the condition (?!>^(1 — (5) > 1 be met.^^
In addition to the above actual and perceived policy rules, the model is
exactly as the one developed above, with the dynamics of value added,
domestic inflation, and the real price of oil summarized by equations (14)-
(16). Solving the model for domestic inflation and value added gives:
TT^.f = ast + bvt
yt = c St + d I't
where a, 6, c, and d are given by:
_
(1 - Ps) («ci'm(l - Qm)"^ + ApFs'
(1 - Ps)il - Pps) + iM^ -S)- Ps)l^
<0
>
l+(?i„(l -6)k
am(l - am)~^(l - Ps){l-0Ps) - (0^(1 -5)- Ps)Xprs
[1 - Ps)(l - Pps) + {(PM - S) - P.)'i
I
1 + 0^(1 -5)k
Imposing vt = (507r7r//,t into the solution (so that the central bank actuahy
adheres to its chosen rule) we get
a
^'•' = r^w. ''
thus implj'ing that CPI inflation is
a- .
'^c,t =
-—
r7-~ st + x ^st
13. The hypothesis of an indeterminate equihbrium (and, hence, the possibiUty of
sunspot fluctuations) in the first part of the sample could also potentially explain the
greater volatility in both inflation and GDP, as emphasized by Clarida et al. (2000).
We choose to pursue an alternative line of explanation here, which does not rely on
multiplicity of equilibria.
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Value added is then given by:
yt = c St -f
c +
K5 rrg^t
da4>T;S
1 — b6(j)Tj
St
Figure 1 3. Credibility and Policy Tradeoffs
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Figure 13 displays the loci of standard deviations of GPI inflation and GDP
associated with 5 = and 5 = 0.5, i.e. corresponding to a full credibility
and a low credibility environment respectivel)'. In both cases we restrict
(pTT to values above 2 in order to guarantee a unique equiUbrium. We set 7
equal to 0.9, and calibrate the oil shares to their 1997 values. Two points
are worth noting:
First, allowing for both real wage rigidities and poor credibility, the model's
predictions come closer but stih fall somewhat short of matching the (con-
ditional) standard deviations of CPI inflation and GDP in our two samples.
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represented by the two crosses. Given the primitive nature of the model,
this may not be overly worrisome.
Second, credibility gains can improve the tradeoff facing policymakers sig-
nificantly. The quantitative gains, however, do not seem sufficient to ac-
count, by themselves, for the observed decline in macro volatility in the
face of oil shocks, documented earlier in the paper. But they show that
improved credibility may certainly have contributed to that declirie.
Figures 14a-c provides some evidence of the changes in the Fed's response to
oil price shocks, as well as an indicator of potential changes in its credibility.
The rolling IRFs displayed are based on estimated bivariate VARs with the
price of oil and, one at a time, a measure of inflation expectations over the
next 12 months from the Michigan Survey, the 3-month Treasury Bill rate,
and the real interest rate (measured as the difference between the previous
two variables).
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Response ol Expected Inflation
Quarters alter stiock
First, and most noticeable, the response of expected inflation to an oil price
shock of the same size (normalized here to 10 percent rise) has shrunk
dramatically over time, from a rise of about 50 basis points in the 1970s,
to about 20 basis points since the mid-1980s, and has remained remarkably
stable after that.
Second, and perhaps surprisingly, the strength of the response of the nom-
inal interest rate has not changed much across sample periods. The shrink-
ing response of expected inflation implies, however, that the response of
the real rate to an oil price shock has become stronger over time. In fact,
the real rate appears to decline significantly in response to an oil price
shock in the 1970s, an observation consistent with the (unconditional) ev-
idence in Clarida et al. (2000). This decline may have contributed to the
large and persistent increase in inflation. It also suggests that had the Fed
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Response o( Nominal Rate
Quarters atter stiocl<
pursued a stronger anti-inflationary policy (keeping credibility unchanged)
the adverse eS'ects on output and inflation would have been even larger.^'*
To summarize the lessons from the analysis above: While the weak response
of inflation to oil price shocks in recent years is often interpreted as a
consequence of a stronger anti-inflation stance by the Fed (a higher 0^, in
the context of out model), the evidence of a smaller dechne in employment
14. Note that, for the most recent period, the real interest rate shows very httle change
in response to an oil price shock. There are several explanations for this finding. First,
as shown above, several measures of inflation (including expected inflation and GDP
deflator inflation) hardly change in response to the oil price rise. If the Fed responds to
those measures, the required adjustment in the nominal and real rates will be relatively
small. Secondly, the Fed may also adjust rates in response to measures of economic
activity. The decline in GDP and employment may thus have induced an interest rate
rate movement in the opposite direction, with the net effect being close to zero.
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Response of Real Rats
Quarters after shock
anid GDP suggests that an enhanced anti-inflation credibihty may also have
played a role. The sharp decline in the response of inflation expectations
to an oil price shock is certainly consistent with this view.
6.3 Declining Oil Shares
A third hypothesis for the improved policy tradeoff is that the share of oil in
consumption and in production is smaller today than it was in the 1970s. To
examine the possible impact of these changes we simulate two alternative
versions of our model, with am and x calibrated using 1973 and 1997 data
on the share of oil in production costs and consumption expenditures (see
Appendix 2 for details of construction). In light of this evidence we choose
am = 1.5% and x = 2.3% (1973 data) for the 1970s, and Om = 1.2% and
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X = 1.7% (based on data for 1997) for our two calibrations.
Figure 15. Changing Oil Shares and Policy Tradeoffs
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Figure 15 displays CPI inflation and GDP volatility for the two calibra-
tions, keeping the index of real wage rigidities unchanged at 7 = 0.9 (and
5 = 0). The conclusion is similar to those reached for the other two can-
didate explanations. The reduction in the oil shares in consumption and
production cannot account for the full decline in volatility, but it clearly
accounts for part of it. (The values of am and x in 1977, thus after the first
but before the second oil shock, were 1.8% and 3.6% respectively. This sug-
gests that, other things equal, the second oil shock should have had larger
effects than the first. As we saw earher, the opposite appears to be true.)
The analysis above has examined the effects on CPI inflation and GDP
volatility of changes in one parameter at a time. Figure 16 shows the com-
bined effect of a simultaneous change in the three parameters. The first
calibration, which is meant to roughly capture the 1970s environment,
assumes strong wage rigidities (7 = 0), limited central bank credibility
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((5 = 0.5), and the 1973 oil shares. The second caUbration assumes mild
wage rigidities (7 = 0.6), full credibility (5 — 0), and the 1997 oil shares.
The figure shows that the combination of the three changes in the envi-
ronment we have focused on can in principle more than account for the
improvement in the trade-off observed in the data.
Figure 16. Combined Effects
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7 Concluding Comments
We have reached five main conclusions:
First, that the effects of oil price shocks must have coincided in time with
large shocks of a different nature. Given our partial identification strategy,
we have not identified these other shocks. We have given some evidence
that increases in other commodity prices were important in the 1970s. We
have not identified the other shocks for the 2000s.
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Second, that the effects of oil price shocks have changed over time, with
steadily smaller effects on prices and wages, as well as on output and em-
ploj'ment.
Third, that a first plausible cause for these changes is a decrease in real
wage rigidities. Such rigidities are needed to generate the type of large
stagflation in response to adverse supply shocks such as those that took
place in the 1970s. We have shown that the response of the consumption
wage to the marginal rate of substitution, and thus to employment, appears
to have increased over time.
Fourth, that a second plausible cause for these changes is the increased
credibility of monetary pohcy. We have offered a simple formalization of
lack of credibility and its effect on the volatility frontier. We have shown
that the response of expected inflation to oil shocks has substantially de-
creased over time.
Fifth, that a third plausible cause for these changes is simply the decrease
in the share of oil in consumption and in production. The decline is large
enough to have quantitatively significant imphcations.
Despite the length of the paper, we are conscious, however, of the lim-
itations of our arguments. Some of the evidence, for example, the IRF
evidence for Japan, does not fit our story. The model we have developed is
too primitive in many dimensions, and its quantitative implications must
be taken-with caution. The development of a richer model, at least with
respect to the specification of production, and of real wage rigidities, and
its estimation, seem the natural next steps to check the conclusions reached
above. The different implications of the various candidate hypotheses for
the shape of impulse response functions in response to changes in the price
of oil makes us hopeful that structural estimation can succeed in identifying
their respective importance.
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Appendix 1: A New-Keynesian Model for an Oil-Importing
Economy
The present appendix describes in more detail the model used in Section
5 and derives the equilibrium conditions underlying the simulations in the
main text.
Households
We assume a continuum of identical infinitely-hved households. Each house-
hold seeks to maximize
oo
EoJ2(^'U{CuNt)
f=0
whgre
Ct = Qx C'm^t ^q,t
and where Cm, t denotes consumption of (imported) oil, C^^t = (/q Cq,t(i)''~^ di
is a CES index of domestic goods, A^f denotes employment or hours worked,
and ex = X~^{'i--x)'^^'^^-
We assume that period utility is given by
U{CuNt)=\ogCt--^N}+'^
1
The period budget constraint, conditional on optimal allocation of expen-
ditures among different domestic goods (not derived here) is given by:
Pg,tCq,t + Pm,tCm.t + Q? Bt = WfNt + Bt-1 + lit
where Pg^t = [Jo Pq,t{i)^~'^ di)
''"
is a price index for domestic goods, Prn.t
is the price of oil (in domestic currency), and Wt is the nominal wage. Qf
is the price of a one-period nominally riskless domestic bond, pa3dng one
65
unit of domestic currency. Bt denotes the quantity of that bond purchased
in period t. For simphcity we assume no access to international financial
markets.
The optimal allocation of expenditures between imported and domestically
produced good implies
Pq^tC.^t = (1 - x) Pc,tCt
Pm,tCm,t = X Pc,tCt
where Pc^t = Pm,t Pq~t^ i^ ^^^® '^^^ index. Note that x corresponds, in equi-
librium, to the share of oil in consumption. Note also that Pc,i = Pq^t S^-,
where St = -p^ denotes the real price of oil,expressed in terms of domes-
tically produced goods. Taldng logs,
Pc,t = Pq,t + X St
where Sj = pm,t — Pq,t is the log of the real price of oil (measured in terms
of domestic goods),
Furthermore, and conditional on an optimal allocation between the two
tj'pes of goods, we have Pq^tCq^t + Pm,tCm,t = Pc,tCt, which can be substi-
tuted into the budget constraint. The resulting constraint can then be used
to derive the household's remaining optiraahty conditions. The intertem-
poral optimality condition is given by:
Ct+i Pc,t+1
Under the assumption of perfect competition in labor markets (to be re-
laxed below), the household's intratemporal optimality condition is given
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by
Pal
Ct Nf = MRSt
which is the perfectly competitive labor supply schedule. The log-linearized
version of the previous two equations, found in the text, are given by:
Ct =^ Et{ct+\] - {it - Et{-Kc,t+\} - p) (18)
wt - Pc,t = Ct + 4> Tit (19)
where we use lower-case letters to denote the logarithms of the original
variables, and where Tr^f = Pc,t — Pc,t-i represents CPI inflation.
Finiis
t
Each firm produces a differentiated good indexed by i 6 [0, 1] with a pro-
duction function
Qt{t) = At MtiiT-^NtiiT-
where q-,„ + a„ < 1
.
Independently of how prices are set, and assuming that firms take the price
of both inputs as given, cost minimization imphes that firm i's nominal
marginal cost ^t{i) is given by:
Letting A4^{i) = Pq^t{'i)/'^t{i) denote firm i's gross markup, we have
M^ti^ StMt(l) = QVn Qt(i)
p,,t{i)
p,,t
Let Qt = (/o Qti^y " diy ' denote aggregate gross output. It follows
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that
"' -^ (^'>
where we have used the fact that Qt{i) = {Pq,t{i)/Pq,t)^'^ Qt (the demand
schedule fachig firm i), and defined M^ as the average gross markup,
weighted by firms' mput shares.
Taking logs and ignoring constants
mt =
-i4 - st + qt
where jj.^ = logA^f. The latter expression can be plugged back into the
(log linearized) aggregate production function to yield the reduced form
gross output equation
qt = Z {at + Oinnt - CCmSt - oiml4) (22)
1 - Clm.
Consumption and Gross Output
Note that in an equilibrium with balanced trade (and hence Bt — 0) the
following relation must hold:
Pc,tCt = Pq.tQt — Pm,t^'It
= ('-Sr)^"*
where we have used (21) to derive the second equality. Taking logs and
using the relations between the different price indexes, we obtain
ct = qt-XSt + V l4 (23)
where 77 =
_^°^^, and M^ denotes the steady state markup.
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Combining (22) and (23), and invoking the fact that f A4°-a^ ~ T^^J >^t -
for plausiblj' low values of a^ and the net markup measures M^ — 1 and
/j.j', we can write
ct = at + nt - + X St 24
1 - Qm 1 - Q'm, V 1 - arn.
Gross Output, Value Added, and the GDP DeBator
The GDP deflator Py^t is imphcitly defined by
Pg,t = {Py,t)^~"^ {Pm,tr^
I
Taking logs and using the definition of the terms of trade St
Py,t = Pq,t
- St
-1- Otm
Value added (or GDP), Vt, is then defined by
Py.tYt = Pq,tQt " Pm.tMt
which can be log linearized to yield
Q'.
Vt = qt+
,
St + T] fi^
1 -am
1
[at + an nt)
1 - an_
where the last equality uses the approximation invoked above.
Note that combining the above expressions for consumption and value
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added we can obtain the following relation between the two
Price Setting
Here we assume that firms set prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo
(1983). Each period only a fraction 1 — ^ of firms, selected randomly, reset
prices. The remaining firms, with measure 9, keep their prices unchanged.
The optimal price setting rule for a firm resetting prices in period t is given
by
Et
I
f; d' At,t+k Qt+k]t {P; - M" ^,+,|,) 1=0 (25)
where P^ denotes the price newly set at time t, Qt-\-k\t ^i^d 'it+k\t ^re
respectively the level of output and marginal cost in period ^ + fc for a firm
that last set its price in period t, and M^ = e/(e — 1) is the desired gross
mai'kup. Note that the latter also corresponds to the gross markup in the
zero inflation perfect foresight steady state.
The domestic price level evolves according to the difference equation
p,,t = [e {P,,t-i)'-' + (1 - ^) {Ptl'-']
^'
(26)
Combining the log-linearized version of (25) and (26) around a zero in-
flation steady state, yields the following equation for domestic inflation,
7r,,t = /3£;a^g.t+i}-Ap/i? (27)
where /If = ^ — jjP denotes the (log) deviation of the average markup from
its desired level, and Ap = d-^Hi-z^^) i-"^^ ,
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Appendix 2. Computation of the Oil Sheire
We think of the U.S'. economy as having two sectors, an oil-producing
sector and a non-oil producing sector. We define the oil producing sector
as the sum of the "oil and gas extraction" sector (NAIC code 211) and the
"petroleum and coal" sector (NAIC code 324). ("Petroleum refineries", a
subsector of "petroleum and coal" is available only for benchmark years,
the last available one being 1997. It represents 85% of the gross output of
the "petroleum and coal" sector.) We define the non-oil producing sector
as the rest of the economy.
To compute relevant numbers for 2005, we use data from the 10 tables
from the BEA site.
In 2005, "oil and gas extraction" output was $227b, imports were $223b,
for a total of $450b. Of this total, $5b was for domestic final uses, $440b
was for intermediates, of which $259 went to "Petroleum and coal" , and
$181b went to the non-oil sector. Petroleum and coal output was $402b,
imports were $65b, for a total of $467b. Of this total, $167 was for domestic
final uses, $279b for intermediates to the non-oil producing sector.
In 2005, total U.S. value added was $12,455b. Value added by "oil and gas"
was $12b, value added by "petroleum and coal" was $12b, so value added
in the non oil-producing sector was $12,431b.
These numbers imply a value for x of (181-F279)/(12,431-M81+279)=
3.5%, and an estimate of a is (5-M67)/(12,43H-181-h279)= 1.-3%.
The shares obviously depend very much on the price of oil. The same com-
putation for the benchmark year of 1997 (which allows us to use "petroleum
refining" rather than "petroleum and coal" together) gives 1.7% and 1.2%
respectively.
For the years 1973 and 1977, sectors are classified according to indus-
try number codes. We construct the oil-producing sector as the sum of
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of "crude petroleum and natural gas" (1977 industry number 8) and "pe-
troleum refining" (1977 industry number 31). The same steps as above
yield x = 2.3% and a = 1.5% in 1973, and x = 3.6% and a = 1.8% in
1977.
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